Bloom Energy [BE] — Valuation, Factor Scorecard & Consensus Bridge
⚠️ SUPERSEDED IN PART — 2026-07-29
The position verdict in this document is retired. Under the current framework (
references/criteria.md, 2026-07-29) the memo outputs an analysis, not a position. Whether an analysis justifies a position is a question about a particular book, and two books answer it differently.The Gate block and the Gate 4 expected-return arithmetic below are also superseded, by the named Criteria (each with a type: BINDING or MEASURED, returning PASS / FAIL / INDETERMINATE), the reverse-DCF implied-path test, and a separate 12-month target.
→ Current analysis:
Bloom_Energy_Criteria_and_Valuation_2026-07-29.mdEverything else here — the research, the evidence, the mechanism work — stands. Residual references to "Watchlist" in the prose below are the historical record of the 2026-07-28 assessment and are left intact deliberately.
Phase Space Research | July 28, 2026 | Tasks 3 of 9 | Skill v1.4.2
Companion to Bloom_Energy_Research_2026-07-28.md. Spot $183.90 aftermarket / $166.84 close
on 2026-07-28, the day BE reported Q2 2026 after the bell.
5. FACTOR & ANOMALY SCORECARD
| Factor | Reading | Basis | Signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| Momentum (Jegadeesh–Titman 1993) | 12-1 = +386% to +800% | Alpaca daily, 252d | Top-decile POSITIVE |
| Trend | −5.9% vs 200-day at close ( +3.8% at $183.90); −37.1% vs 50-day | BROKEN — see below | |
| PEAD (Bernard–Thomas 1989) | rev surprise +29.0%, EPS surprise +90% | vs $826m / $0.41 consensus | Strong POSITIVE |
| Revisions (Chan–Jegadeesh–Lakonishok 1996) | FY26 guide midpoint +8.3% vs prior consensus revenue, +24.4% vs prior consensus EPS | Strong POSITIVE | |
| Accruals (Sloan 1996) | TTM NI $244.9m vs TTM CFO $737.7m ⇒ accruals −11.9% of avg assets | POSITIVE (low accruals) | |
| Gross profitability (Novy-Marx 2013) | TTM GP $972.7m / assets $5,628.4m = 17.3% (23.5% on avg assets) | Moderate positive | |
| Asset growth (Cooper–Gulen–Schill 2008) | assets $2,530.4m → $5,628.4m YoY = +122.4% | Worst-decile NEGATIVE | |
| F-score (Piotroski 2000) | 7 / 9 — fails only current-ratio and share-issuance | Positive | |
| Volatility | realised 110.6% (1y) / 122.5% (3m) / 129.3% (1m) | Extreme | |
| Beta | 4.20 raw, 3.14 Blume-adjusted vs SPY | 252d | Extreme |
This is, on the factor evidence alone, the strongest long profile this system has underwritten — top-decile momentum, a large positive earnings surprise, a large upward guidance revision, and genuinely low accruals, in one name. The two offsets are real: +122.4% asset growth sits in the worst decile of an anomaly that works, and it is driven by an external capital raise (cash $606m → $2,667m), which is the bad kind of asset growth rather than the benign kind.
The momentum-crash caveat (Daniel & Moskowitz 2016)
12-1 momentum of +386% to +800% combined with 110% realised volatility and a price 37% below its own 50-day is the exact configuration in which momentum strategies crash. Daniel & Moskowitz show momentum's worst drawdowns cluster in high-volatility states following a trend break. The momentum reading is top-decile and maximally fragile. These are not in tension — they are the same fact.
6. VALUATION
At $183.90 (aftermarket) on 323.3m diluted shares: market cap $59.5bn. Cash $2,666.9m + restricted $21.6m against recourse debt $2,475.4m, non-recourse $2.6m and financing obligations $206.5m ⇒ net cash ≈ $4m, i.e. essentially zero. EV ≈ market cap.
| Multiple on FY2026E guidance midpoint | at $166.84 close | at $183.90 |
|---|---|---|
| EV / revenue ($4,050m) | 13.3x | 14.7x |
| P/E on non-GAAP EPS ($2.70) | 62x | 68x |
| EV / non-GAAP EBIT ($850m) | 63x | 70x |
6.1 Scenarios to FY2029E
Duration discipline per references/regime-change-test.md: the disclosed ~$6bn product backlog covers
roughly 1.7 years of product revenue, so 2026–27 is modelled on the contracted base and 2028+ reverts.
| prob | 2026 | 2027 | 2028 | 2029 | FY29 op margin | FY29 EPS | exit | FY29 value | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bull | 25% | 4,200 | 6,300 | 8,820 | 11,466 | 27% | $7.37 | 32x | $235.84 |
| Base | 50% | 4,050 | 5,670 | 7,371 | 8,845 | 24% | $5.19 | 24x | $124.56 |
| Bear | 25% | 3,900 | 4,485 | 4,485 | 4,037 | 14% | $1.53 | 14x | $21.42 |
Correction applied after Excel readback. A first pass used an 18% tax rate in the bull case and 21% elsewhere — a lower tax rate in the bull case double-counts optimism. All three scenarios now use 21%, which cut bull FY29 EPS from $7.64 to $7.37. Caught only by reading computed cells back out of the workbook, which is why that verification step exists. Conclusion unchanged.
6.2 Gate 4 on the CORRECTED basis (see the trade-construction memo §8)
The original version of this section was wrong. It discounted scenario payoffs at Ke and then compared the
result to a 4.7% hurdle, which double-charges the required return. The identity is
E[R]_reported = (E[R]_true − Ke)/(1+Ke), so every Ke column encoded the same expected return — the table had
one degree of freedom presented as two, and its apparent "robustness across discount rates" was an artifact.
Found by the memo-critic adversarial review at Task 5.5. Error: 15.0 percentage points a year, running in
the name's favour.
Expected FY2029 value, probability-weighted: $126.60 against a $183.90 spot.
| bear weight | E[FY2029 value] | 3-yr annualised E[R] | vs 4.7% hurdle |
|---|---|---|---|
| 40% | $110.15 | −16.9% | −21.6pp |
| 30% | $121.11 | −13.4% | −18.1pp |
| 25% (house) | $126.60 | −11.7% | −16.4pp |
| 20% | $132.08 | −10.1% | −14.8pp |
| 10% | $143.05 | −7.1% | −11.8pp |
| 0% | $154.02 | −4.2% | −8.9pp |
Fails at every bear weight including 0%. Break-even base exit multiple 40.1x, flat across Ke. Price at which E[R] equals the hurdle: $110.30.
6.3 Reverse-DCF — what $183.90 requires you to believe
Solving for the FY2029 revenue that justifies today's price, holding FY2029 non-GAAP operating margin at 24% (already ~3pts above FY2026E guidance):
| exit P/E | Ke | required FY29 revenue | implied 2026→29 revenue CAGR |
|---|---|---|---|
| 50x | 12% | $8,814m | 29.6% |
| 40x | 12% | $11,096m | 39.9% |
| 35x | 12% | $12,726m | 46.5% |
| 30x | 12% | $14,900m | 54.4% |
| 30x | 20.4% | $18,587m | 66.2% |
| 25x | 20.4% | $22,368m | 76.8% |
The single most favourable defensible cell — a 50x exit multiple and a 12% cost of equity for a beta-3.1 stock — still requires revenue to compound ~30%/yr for three years on top of a year that itself doubles. Every other cell requires 40–77% CAGRs.
Base-rate check (Chan/Karceski/Lakonishok 2003): growth persistence beyond chance is not observable in the data; the frequency of firms above $2bn revenue sustaining >30% growth for a further three years after a >75% growth year is low single-digit percent. This does not say the bull case is wrong. It says the price already embeds it, and then some.
7. CONSENSUS BRIDGE
| Street | House | Gap | |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY2026E revenue | ~$4.05bn (now = guidance) | $4.05bn (guidance midpoint) | none |
| FY2026E non-GAAP EPS | ~$2.70 (now = guidance) | $2.70 | none |
| Price target | $289.63 mean (TipRanks); JPMorgan $346 (raised from $267) | $126.60 FY2029E | — |
| Rating | Moderate Buy — 9 Buy / 11 Hold | Watchlist | — |
Numbers-vs-multiple decomposition — this is the crux. The house forecast is the Street forecast for FY2026; both are the company's guidance. There is no numbers disagreement at all. The entire $190+ gap between the $289.63 consensus target and the house value is the exit multiple and the discount rate. The Street is capitalising FY2027–28 earnings at 50–80x; the house is capitalising FY2029 earnings at 14–32x and discounting at 20.4%. To clear the hurdle the house would need a ~40x base-case exit multiple on FY2029 earnings.
That is a pure multiple disagreement, which is exactly the pattern calibration item B8 tracks — and it is now the fifth instance.